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THE FAILURE OF WORDS: HABEAS CORPUS REFORM, THE
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT,
AND WHEN A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BECOMES
FINAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1)
INTRODUCTION
Originally enacted in 1948,28 U.S.C. § 2255 created a remedy for
federal prisoners seeking "to vacate, set aside or correct [a] sentence
... Section 2255 is "the principal postconviction remedy for federal
convicts. 2 Congress "intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy
identical in scope to federal habeas corpus."' Until 1996, motions
filed under § 2255 were subject to no statute of limitations4 and
could be filed at any time.5 The lack of a statue of limitations in
§ 2255 reflected the history of federal habeas corpus.6
On April 24, 1996, the 104th Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).7 The purpose of the
AEDPA is "[t]o deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and]
provide for an effective death penalty .... 8 Title I of the AEDPA,
"Habeas Corpus Reform," provides for a one year statute of
1. DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 4-1, at
163 (1996 ed.).
2. Id.
3. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415,420 (1959) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (stating that there is no statute of limitations for § 2255 motions).
5. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS 9 advisory committee's note. The
section governing delayed motions, however, provides that a motion filed under § 2255 "may
be dismissed if it appears that the government has been prejudiced in its ability to respond
to the motion by delay in its filing ...." RuLES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS 9(a).
But see McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (reversing the
district court's dismissal of a § 2255 motion for being late after 15 years because "tardiness
is irrelevant where a constitutional issue is raised and where the prisoner is still confined').
6. WILKES, supra note 1, § 4-15, at 253.
7. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
8. Id. § 105.
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limitations in § 105. This section thus amends 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Section 105 provides in pertinent part: "A 1-year period of
limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation
period shall run from the latest of-(1) the date on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final .... 0
Soon after the passage of the AEDPA, several circuit courts of
appeals had to decide when a judgment of conviction becomes
"final" for purposes of the new limitation in the case of the prisoner
who does not file a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court.11 Specifically, the courts were asked to decide
whether the statute of limitations for § 2255 motions begins to run
when the court of appeals affirms the district court's conviction and
sentence, or when the time for filing a petition for certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court expires. A minority of courts have
held the former,12 a majority the latter."
In arriving at their different outcomes, both sides of the
argument relied heavily upon different constructions1' of the
9. Section 105 is titled "Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence."
10. Id. Section 105 continues:
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Id.
11. See United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274 (10thCir. 2000); United States v. Gamble,
208 F.3d 536 (SthCir. 2000); United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9thCir. 2000); United
States v. Torres, 211 F.3d 836 (4thCir. 2000); Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir.
1999); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 (7thCir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1113 (1999).
12. See Torres, 211 F.3d at 84%- Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674.
13. See Burch, 202 F.3d at 1279; Gamble, 208 F.3d at 537; Garcia, 210 F.3d at 1061;
Kapral, 166 F.3d at 577.
14. In this Note, construction and interpretation are used interchangeably. Historically,
"interpretation determines the meaning of words and construction determines the
application of words to the facts." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:04, at 24 (6th ed. 2000). This is a distinction, however, without any
practical difference. Id. An illustration of this point comes from Kapral, "We begin with the
familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is
the language of the statute itself." 166 F.3d at 569 (emphasis added) (quoting Consumer
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relevant statutory language."5 Among the factors the courts
measured were the intent of the legislature when enacting the
AEDPA,6 the purpose of the AEDPA, 7 the dictionary definitions of
"final" and "judgment of conviction,"" and, to a much lesser extent,
practical 9 and policy considerations.20 As this Note will illustrate,
however, careful analysis of the arguments on each side reveal that
the textual, intrinsic arguments fail, leaving only extrinsic factors,
policy considerations, and the historical purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus to accurately guide courts to the correct conclusion.
The conclusion of this Note is that both sides' methods of analysis
were faulty and internally inconsistent, and that extrinsic, policy,
and historical considerations prove that the conclusion of the
Kapral court and the other courts in the majority is, in fact, the
correct one. For the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1), a judgment of
conviction becomes final when the time for filing a petition of
certiorari expires, not when the court of appeals affirms the
conviction and sentence of the defendant.
Part I of this Note briefly sketches the history of habeas corpus,
the purposes and historical context of the passage of§ 2255 in 1948,
and the purposes and context of the 1996 AEDPA amendments to
§ 2255. Part II analyzes the arguments behind the conclusions of
both the majority and minority of courts, pointing out flaws and
weaknesses on each side, focusing principally on the presumptions
that each side makes. Part III discusses one of the most relevant
and recent Supreme Court decisions, Duncan v. Walker.2' The
analysis of Duncan reveals that although a majority of the Court
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
15. The Seventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to address this particular issue in
Gendron. The court relied almost exclusively on the RusseUo presumption of statutory
interpretation in arriving at its conclusion that the one-year limitation begins to run on the
date the circuit court affirms the conviction and sentence. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674. In
Kapral, the most analytically exhaustive case on the majority side, the Third Circuit relied
heavily on the context of the words and a comparison of§ 2255(1) with other provisions of the
AEDPA. 166 F.3d at 569.
16. See, e.g., Kapral, 166 F.3d at 569 ("We must determine which concept of Tmality'
Congress intended in § 2255.'); Gendron, 154 F.3d at 673.
17. See Kapral, 166 F.3d at 571, 573.
18. See, e.g., Burch, 202 F.3d at 1276; Kapral, 166 F.3d at 570.
19. See Torres, 211 F.3d at 842.
20. See Kapral, 166 F.3d at 571.
21. 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
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may be considered textualists, their own reasoning will lead them
to conclude that a textualist approach is inappropriate in this case.
The Note concludes that it is impossible to interpret the language
of the § 2255 amendments in the AEDPA without resorting to
extrinsic policy considerations, and explains how these outside
considerations firmly support the holdings of the majority of circuit
courts that have considered the issue.
I. HISTORY & CONTEXT
A. Habeas Corpus2
1. England
The first seeds that would eventually evolve into the writ of
habeas corpus are said to have been sown in the Magna Carta in
1215.23 As first used, habeas corpus was much more narrow in scope
than it is today.24 The scope of habeas corpus expanded because of
jurisdictional disagreements between English superior courts and
English local courts.25 The form of habeas corpus the courts used,
habeas corpus cum causa,26 compelled the sheriff to produce the
22. Habeas corpus literally means "produce the body." BADSHAH K MIAN, AMERICAN
HABEAS CORPUS: LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 6 (1984). Habeas corpus is: "A writ employed
to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or
detention is not illegal (habeas corpus ad subjiciendum)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th
ed. 1999); see also infra note 26.
23. See 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104 (3d ed. 1944). But see
DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA 5 (1966) (stating "that habeas
corpus and Magna Carta part ways; they do not flow from a single source," and that it is a
"myth that habeas corpus stemmed from Magna Carta"). Regardless of the truth of this
assertion, by the seventeenth century the English Parliament was arguing that habeas
corpus derived directly from the Magna Carta. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 45 (1980).
24. JOSEPHINE R. POTUTO, PRISONERCOLLATERALATTACKS § 1:3, at 6 (1991) (noting that
habeas corpus was limited to challenging an indefinite confinement by the king, but only
when the reason for the confinement was within the jurisdiction of the courts).
25. DUKER, supra note 23, at 27.
26. At common law, there were several forms of habeas corpus: habeas corpus ad
faciendum, habeas corpus ad recipiendum, habeas corpus ad respondendum, habeas corpus
ad satisfaciendum, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, habeas corpus ad testificandum, habeas
corpus capias ita, and habeas corpus quod distringat. See DUKER, supra note 23, at 17-19,
13840, 287. "[Tlhe phrase 'habeas corpus' used alone refers to the common-law writ of
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prisoner who was the subject of the courts' jurisdictional dispute.27
Through a series of important cases, beginning with the Case of the
Five Knights28 and culminating with the Chamber's Case,29 "[tihe
questioning of the validity of commitments, previously an incidental
effect of the writ, now became the major object." 0
Courts generally limited the use of the writ to challenge
"commitment in criminal cases before conviction."" Habeas corpus
relief was not available to prisoners "held by a valid warrant or
pursuant to the execution or judgment of a proper court."3 2
Essentially, "a convicted person was not entitled to the privilege of
the writ because appeal was the remedy for a conviction contrary to
law."33
2. America
Although they did not do so immediately,3" the British colonies in
America had adopted habeas corpus by the late 1600s.3 5 By the time
of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, three of the twelve state
constitutions of the original thirteen colonies had a habeas corpus
provision. 6 At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the
Framers viewed habeas corpus as so fundamental that they did not
expressly provide for the writ, but instead, because they assumed
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum ....* Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 n.6 (1976) (citing Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807)).
27. DUKER, supra note 23, at 27; see also 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 109-13.
28. 3 State Trials 1-59 (KB. 1627).
29. 79 Eng. Rep. 717 (KB. 1629).
30. DUKER, supra note 23, at 46.
31. Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review
Reconsidered, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1097 (1995) (referring to the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679). Forsythe describes the 1079 Act as "the most significant part of the
English law of habeas corpus for its impact on American law at the Founding." Id. at 1095;
see also Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
32. Forsythe, supra note 31, at 1097 (quoting Dallin Oates, Habeas Corpus in the States .
1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 245 (1965)).
33. Id. at 1100 (footnote omitted).
34. See MIAN, supra note 22, at 41.
35. Id. at 51, 55.
36. Id. at 73. Rhode Island did not have a state constitution.
2002] 445
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that people enjoyed the privilege,37 simply prohibited its abolish-
ment except in certain extraordinary circumstances.3 8
The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts the power to grant
the writ. 9 The writ, however, only applied to federal prisoners ' and
could only be used to challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing
body.41 It was not until 1867 that the writ's application was
expanded to include state prisoners, and still the inquiry remained
limited to the jurisdiction of the sentencing body.'2 This was the
state of affairs until the mid-twentieth century.3
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court expanded habeas
corpus to include attacks based on other constitutional grounds."
Since 1942, habeas corpus provides relief if-
(1) the conviction is void for lack o f personal or subject
matter jurisdiction; (2) the statute defining the offense is
unconstitutional, or the conviction was obtained in violation of
a federal constitutional right; (3) the statute authorizing the
sentence is unconstitutional, or the sentence was obtained in
violation of a federal constitutional right; (4) the sentence is
contrary to the applicable statute, in excess of the statutory
maximum, or otherwise unauthorized by law; or (5) the
conviction or the sentence is otherwise deemed subject to
collateral attack.15
37. See Habeas Corpus: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 12 (1993) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus
Hearingsl (statement of H. Lee Sarokin, U.S. District Court Judge (N.J.)) ("So fundamental,
by the way, that it is not provided for in the Constitution. The Constitution merely says it
can't be abolished. That is because everyone assumed how important the writ was."). Judge
Sarokin granted the habeas petition in the famous case of Rubin "Hurricane" Carter, subject
of the movie, THE HUMCANE (MCAfUniversal Pictures 1999), starring Denzel Washington.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
39. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
40. See POTrTO, supra note 24, at 9.
41. See Powell v. Stone, 428 U.S. 465, 475 (1976).
42. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385).
43. See WILKES, supra note 1, § 3-1, at 116-17 (stating that habeas corpus was expanded
in the late-nineteenth century to include violations of double jeopardy, sentences "contrary
to the applicable statute," and punishment in"excess of the statutory maximum, or otherwise
unauthorized by law...").
44. See id. § 3-1, at 117 (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)).
45. Id. (footnotes omitted).
446 [Vol. 44:441
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B. 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 5
1. Original Purpose
Section 2255 derived from a bill by the Judicial Conference
Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure.' The Committee intended
to address "serious administrative problems associated with habeas
corpus.' The idea was to provide "federal prisoners with a post
conviction remedy equivalent in scope to habeas corpus,"" but
eliminate many of the "administrative problems associated with
habeas corpus.' 9 First, the number of habeas petitions had
increased significantly." Second, habeas corpus was subject to
abuse by federal prisoners."1 Many of the petitions prisoners filed
were repetitious and "patently frivolous."52 This was all the more
difficult for the courts because habeas applications were filed in the
district where the prisoner was confined and not the court where
the prisoner was sentenced.53 The courts in districts where federal
prisons were located therefore had to "handle an inordinate number
of habeas corpus actions,"5' and did not have easy access to
46. Brendan W. Randall, United States v. Cooper: The Writ of Error Coram Nobis and
the Morgan Footnote Paradox, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1073-74, 1075 n.71 (1990).
47. Id.
48. WILKE, supra note 1, § 3-1, at 117 (footnote omitted); see also United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,219 (1952) ([Tlhe sole purpose [of passing 28 U.S.C. § 22551 was to
minimize the diffleulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights
in another and more convenient forum.").
49. Randall, supra note 46, at 1073-74.
50. See id. at 1074 n.63 (citing Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212).
51. The Honorable John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171,
171 (1949). Judge Parker was the chairman of the Judicial Conference's Committee on
Habeas Corpus Procedure.
The federal district court for the District of Columbia provides an example of the abuses
that were occurring. One prisoner filed fifty applications between July 1939 and April 1944,
another twenty-seven, a third twenty-four, a fourth twenty-two, and a fifth twenty. Dorsey
v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (1945). One hundred and nineteen persons averaged five
applications each during this period. Id.
52. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212.
53. Id. at 213.
54. Id. at 213-14. The burden, in terms of sheer number of petitions, upon the courts at
the time is insignificant when compared to today's numbers. In 1936 and 1937, the yearly
average of habeas corpus petitions filed in the United States was 310. By 1943, 1944, and
1945, that number had increased to 845 (excluding the District of Columbia). Id. at 212 n.13.
Five of the eighty-four federal district courts during this latter time frame were,
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witnesses or the records of the case,' which caused further delays
and backlog..
After approving the Committee's recommendations, the Judicial
Conference submitted them to Congress.' Congress did not pass
the two bills, but did incorporate them into its revision of the entire
Judicial Code.
67
The purpose of § 2255 "was to minimize the difficulties en-
countered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights
in another and more convenient forum" " without suppressing
"prisoners' rights of collateral attack upon their convictions."59
2. Nature of § 2255 Proceedings
Historically, the nature of § 2255 has been the subject of much
disagreement. Congress intended the § 2255 remedy to be similar
to the writ of error coram nobis,60 but much broader-"'as broad as
habeas corpus."'61 Subsequent judicial interpretation, however, has
underscored the point that it is more a substitute for habeas corpus
than similar in nature to coram nobis.62 Additionally, later legal
commentators have concluded that the principles of habeas corpus,
nevertheless, handling sixty-three percent of all habeas corpus petitions. Id. at 214 n.1S. Of
those filed between 1943 and 1945, 1556 were filed by federal prisoners. See Parker, supra
note 51, at 172 (citing statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts).
By comparison, "more than one-third of 1845 petitions] will have been filed by only federal
prisoners in [the Southern District of Florida] in the 1996 calendar year.* The Honorable
Lurana S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 295, 297 n.17 (1997).
Judge Snow cites the average number of habeas petitions as 865. See id. This number is
incorrect. Hayman, which Snow cites, actually says the average number was 845. Hayman,
342 U.S. at 212 n.13. However, 865 may have been closer to the truth considering the
District of Columbia was excluded from the Hayman court.
55. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 213.
56. Id. at 215.
57. Id. at 218.
58. Id. at 219.
59. Id.
60. The writ of error coram nobis is [a] writ of error directed to a court for review of its
own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of fact." BLACIKS LAW DICTIONARY 338 (7th
ed. 1999).
61. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 217 (quoting Statement of the Judicial Committee on Habeas
Corpus Procedure (1944)).
62. See Randall, supra note 46, at 1078.
448 [Vol. 44:441
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and not coram nobis, control § 2255 remedies.83 In Hill v. United
States, the Supreme Court announced:
[Ilt conclusively appears from the historic context in which §
2255 was enacted that the legislation was intended simply to
provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate
with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus
in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.65
The language of the section itself, however, indicates that it is
separate and distinct from habeas corpus. 6 In fact, "Itihe federal
habeas corpus remedy continues to be widely utilized when relief is
sought on grounds unrelated to the validity of the conviction or the
sentence." It therefore appears that habeas corpus and § 2255
motions are not "exactly commensurate."
Further disagreement concerned whether a § 2255 proceeding
was a further step in the criminal chain or a separate civil action.
68
In Hayman, Justice Vinson indicated that § 2255 proceedings
were governed by the Civil Rules of Appellate Procedure just like
habeas corpus proceedings.69 In 1976, however, Congress approved
the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United
States District Courts (§ 2255 Rules). The Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule One states that "a motion under § 2255 is a further
step in the movant's criminal case and not a separate civil action
.... "70 Regardless, the § 2255 Rules as a whole "appl[y] a mixture of
civil and criminal rules to section 2255 proceedings ....
Furthermore, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice state that
63. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 589 n.5 (2001).
64. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
65. Id. at 427; see also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974) (stating that
§ 2255 "afford[s] federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus").
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be
entertained ... unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of his detention.").
67. WILKES, supra note 1, § 3-1, at 118.
68. See Randall, supra note 46, at 1080.
69. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 209 n.4.
70. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255, at 1 advisory committee note.
71. Randall, supra note 46, at 1080-81.
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labeling postconviction remedies as either "civil" or "criminal" is
meaningless.72
3. Scope of§ 2255 Proceedings
The scope of relief a § 2255 motion affords is effectively
equivalent to the relief afforded by the writ of habeas corpus."3
Section 2255 provides that relief may be granted on four grounds:
(1) 'the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States;' (2) 'the court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence;' (3) 'the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law;' and (4) the sentence 'is otherwise
subject to collateral attack.'74
Although each of the grounds for relief refers to attacking the
"sentence" and the caption of the statute is "Federal Custody;
Remedies on Motion Attacking Sentence,"75 there is doubt as to
whether this is entirely accurate. At least one commentator has
stated that § 2255 motions are generally used to attack the
underlying conviction.7" Some overlap does exist," but for the
prisoner challenging his sentence and not his conviction, a motion
under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
normally appropriate.7" Others regard the use of the word
"sentence" as an all-inclusive term that encompasses "all of the
proceedings leading up to the sentence. ""'
72. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 22-1.2, at 22.10 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that
rules governing postconviction proceedings should be formed based on the proceeding's
specific characteristics, not its classification as civil or criminal because these labels are
imprecise).
73. See WRIGHT, supra note 63, § 593.
74. Hilly. United States, 368 U.S. 424,426-27 (1962) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255); cf supra
text accompanying note 45.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
76. See POTUTO, supra note 24, at 12.
77. This overlap is not relevant to prisoner's collateral attacks. Id. at 13.
78. Id.
79. WRIGHT, supra note 63, § 593.
450 [Vol. 44:441
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The scope of § 2255 is limited by Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the statute0 These decisions make it clear that there
is a difference between motions claiming constitutional or
jurisdictional errors and those claiming errors of law or fact."' Relief
will be granted for errors of law or fact only if the error is so
fundamental that the due process right to a fair trial has been
violated. 2
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
1. Events Leading to the Passage of the AEDPA
The revisions to habeas corpus within the AEDPA may have
had most to do with two dramatic events, one political and one
tragic,8 that occurred just prior to its passage. First, in the mid-
term elections of 1994, Republicans swept to victory in the House
of Representatives, gaining a majority for the first time since
1952, gaining a majority in the Senate, and picking up eleven
governorships.8 The House Republicans, led by Minority Whip
Newt Gingrich, put forth a broad statement of proposed legislative
reforms called "The Contract with America." 5 The Contract with
America included the proposed "Taking Back Our Streets Act,"
which included provisions for habeas corpus reform and specifically
provided for the one-year limitation to be added to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.8 After fifty years of fighting for restrictions on prisoners'
80. Id.; see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 179 (1979) (holding that "a
postsentencing change in the policies of the United States Parole Commission [that]
prolonged [petitioners'] actual imprisonment beyond the period intended by the sentencing
judge" does not "support a collateral attack on the original sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255");
Hill, 368 U.S. at 428 (holding that prior decisions have limited habeas corpus to "exceptional
circumstances").
81. WRIGHT, supra note 63, § 593.
82. Id.
83. Although depending on your personal political views, beth may have been tragic.
84. Dan Balz, A Historic Republican Triumph: GOP Captures Congress; Party Controls
Both Houses For First Time Since 50's, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at Al. Representative
Newt Gingrich announced at the time that it was "the most significant election in a
generation." Id. at A22.
85. More than three-hundred Republican candidates and incumbents signed 'The
Contract with America" on September 27, 1994, on the steps of the Capitol. Robert Sur,
Clinton Suggests Tax Cut "As Long as I Can Pay for It,' WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al.
86. Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1994, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. I, subtit. A, § 105.
20021
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rights to habeas corpus, 7 Republicans were finally in a position to
make good.
The second major event affecting the passage of the AEDPA was
the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, less than a year after the mid-
term elections of 1994." The tragedy took the lives of"at least 146
people, including fifteen children." 9 During the congressional
debates concerning the AEDPA, the victims and their families were
put forth as examples of why habeas corpus reform was essential."
Supporters of the bill used letters from victims' relatives and
friends as evidence that the American public was behind the
reform. Of course, those on the other side of the issue were just as
quick to show that the survivors really did not want this reform
passed in the memories of their loved ones.92 Nevertheless, it is
apparent from a survey of the debates surrounding the AEDPA
that the Oklahoma City bombing was in the forefront of many
representatives' minds, and that emotions played a large part in the
Act's passage.
87. See generally Larry W. Yackle,A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 381, 422-42 (1996) (discussing the debate over habeas corpus reform between
Democrats and Republicans).
88. See generally Abner J. Mikva, Habeas Corpus and the Oklahoma City Bombing, 48
FED. LAW. 30 (2001).
89. Linnet Myers,Report Warned Before Bombing That Militias Might Turn Deadly, CI.
TRIB., May 4, 1995, at 28.
90. 142 CONG. REC. 4806 (1996) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde (R- Ill.)). Representative
Hyde noted the words of President Bill Clinton: "We need to cut the time delay on the
appeals dramatically. And it ought to be done in the context of this terrorism legislation, so
that it would apply to any prosecutions brought against anyone indicted in Oklahoma...."Id.
At least one commentator has described the Oklahoma City bombing as "political cover" for
the habeas corpus reform included in the AEDPA. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Justices Weave
Intricate Web of Habeas Corpus Decisions, 37 J. TRIAL LAw. AM. 62, 62 (2001).
91. See 141 CONG. REC. 14,526 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch (R-Utah)) (introducing
letters to be printed in the Record including a letter from Alice Maroney-Denison, May 24,
1995, whose father died in the Oklahoma City blast, stating: "I need your support in passing
Habeas reform. The murderers who committed this crime should be executed as soon as
possible, not in 15-20 years. My father will not get to live another 15-20 years so why should
the convicted?").
92. 142 CONG. REC. 4794 (1996) (statement of Rep. Helen Chenoweth (R-Idaho)) (quoting
a letter from Bud Welch whose daughter Julie was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing: "We
have actually learned what is contained in this massive bill, we know that the last thing our
family wants ... is for this legislation ... so crippling of Americans' constitutional liberties to
be passed in our daughter's name and memory.").
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The AEDPA passed against this backdrop of political revolution
and overwhelming tragedy. The election of the first Republican
House since 1952,"3 the aftermath of Oklahoma City, along with the
1993 World Trade Center bombing and the siege at Waco created
the political landscape necessary for such sweeping reform.
2. Reasons Cited for the AEDPA's Habeas Corpus Reform
Proponents of habeas corpus reform cited several reasons why it
was necessary. The legislative history of the AEDPA, particularly
the debates, is replete with examples of how habeas corpus was
broken, and why it needed to be fixed. First, habeas needed reform
in order to restore the public's confidence in the judicial system.9
Specifically, reformers linked habeas abuse to past delays in the
carrying out of death sentences,95 and they did not want such delay
for those convicted of the Oklahoma city bombing.9"
Second, as in 1948, reformers perceived an undue burden on the
federal courts by frivolous, unnecessary petitions.97 Members of
Congress not only saw this as a problem with habeas corpus
generally, but also with § 2255 motions particularly, and members
of the federal judiciary agreed.
Some members of the federal judiciary, however, disagreed
with this assessment of the burden on the courts." According to
93. David Rogers, Running the Show: New GOP Majority Moves to Wield Power Over
Congress, Clinton, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1994, at Al.
94. See Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 37, at 2 (statement ofRep. Canady (R-Fla.))
(linking habeas reform with an effective death penalty when stating "nothing has done more
to undermine public confidence in our system ofjustice in this country than the interminable
delays in carrying out sentences of death"); 141 CONG. REc. 14,533 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.)) ("[The] habeas reform proposal is badly needed to restore public
confidence [in] America's criminal justice system.").
95. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 4567 (1996) (statement of Rep. Lucas (R-Okla.)) (The
habeas corpus reform that is included in this bill will ensure that those who committed this
crime will not be able to delay punishment through endless appeals.").
97. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 4811 (1996) (statement of Rep. Gingrich (R-Ga.)) (describing
the current appeals process as "interminable" and "frivolous").
98. See Snow, supra note 54, at 302 ("In my view, the instances in which § 2255 relief is
warranted are so rare that the vast expenditure of our federal judicial resources required to
process these motions simply cannot be justified.").
99. See Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 37, at 3 (statement of H. Lee Sarokin, U.S.
District Court Judge for the District for New Jersey) ("[Wie at the district court level are not
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testimony of one judge in 1993, habeas corpus applications only
constituted approximately four percent of the federal district court
caseload. o
If it was hard to make the case for federal court overload when
looking at the numbers of habeas corpus motions generally, it was
immeasurably harder to make when taking into account only
motions to vacate sentence. Of the 269,132 civil cases commenced
in federal district courts in the twelve-month period ending
September 30, 1996, motions to vacate sentence (9,729) constituted
only 3.6% of the total. 1'
Third, reformers were concerned about the finality of convictions
in the judicial process. Some thought that a reasonable filing
deadline would help to increase the sense of finality. 10 2 Others,
however, did not think that finality was an issue in cases other
than death penalty cases. Petitioning prisoners who are not
facing the death penalty are, by definition, already in custody and
overburdened by habeas petitions.... [Mlost of the petitions are without merit or frivolous
[and] take very little time of sitting judges and therefore are susceptible to easy and speedy
resolution.").
100. Id. It is not clear that the AEDPA has ameliorated this burden, undue or not,
although the AEDPA seems to have had a significant effect on the number of § 2255 motions
filed by prisoners. Indeed, between 1996, when the AEDPA was passed, and 2000, motions
to vacate sentence in federal district courts declined by 34.8% (9,729 in 1996 compared to
6,341 in 2000), whereas of habeas corpus cases generally have increased by 54% (16,194 in
1996 compared to 24,945 in 2000). 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OFTHE U.S. COuT, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, tbl. C-2A,
available at http:/www/uscourts.gov/judbus2000/contents.html [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL
REPORT].
In the courts of appeals, there was a 30.98% decrease in the number of motions to vacate
sentence between 1997 and 2000 (3,870 in 1997 compared to 2,671 in 2000), whereas of
habeas corpus cases generally increased 184.5% (491 in 1997 compared to 1,397 in 2000). Id.,
tbl. B-1A; see also Peter Ausili, Analyzing Federal Court Statistics for 2000, 226 N.Y. L.J. 1,
col. 1 (July 16, 2001) (noting that between 1996 and 1999 there was a "35 percent drop in
federal prisoner motions to vacate sentence [resulting] ... from [AEDPA ..." and that "state
prisoner habeas corpus petitions have risen during this period and, during fiscal year 2000,
federal prisoner motions to vacate sentence and federal habeas corpus petitions rose 10
percent and 8 percent respectively).
101. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 100, tbl. C-2A. As is the case for federal habeas
petitions generally, the effect of the AEDPA on motions to vacate sentence as a percentage
of the total number of civil cases commenced is insignificant: In 2000, motions to vacate
sentence constituted 2.4% of all civil cases. Id.
102. See 137 CONG. REC. 15,723 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley (R-Iowa)) ("A
reasonable limitation is also called for on Federal habeas corpus petitions in order to promote
some sense of finality in the criminal proceedings.").
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therefore in the process already of serving their "final" sentence.
Petitioning prisoners sentenced to death, on the other hand, have
not served their final sentence and these few people do have
motivation to cause delay in order to postpone execution. 103 The vast
majority of the incarcerated are motivated instead to expedite their
petitioning process in order to gain their freedom. Allowing them to
file their applications for a long time would not cause delay in
determining their final sentence. This is certainly true for motions
to vacate sentence because § 2255 expressly requires that the
petitioner be in custody. 4
3. The AEDPA and § 2255
Congress also cited the "Powell Report" findings as support for
the AEDPA. The "Powell Committee" was the Ad Hoc Committee on
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases that Chief Justice
Rehnquist formed in 1988 in his capacity as head of the Judicial
Conference of the United States." 5 The committee acquired its
moniker because retired Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. chaired it.' °6
The purpose of the committee was to "inquire into 'the necessity
and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and
the lack of finality' in capital cases in which the prisoner had or had
been offered counsel.107
Three problems with the existing habeas corpus process were
identified by the Powell Committee. 10' The only one which relates
103. See Habeas Corpus Hearings, supra note 37, at 4 (statement of Judge Sarokin)
("[Coni'mement is a prerequisite to habeas relief, so ... [the] public's need for finality ... is
not impaired in any way .... Only in death penalty cases is the lack of finality a real ...
problem.*).
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (stating "[a prisoner in custody under sentence"). The custody
requirement of§ 2255 is exactly the same as that which exists under habeas corpus, although
it is read so expansively that it is rarely a problem. See WRIGHT, supra note 63, § 596.
105. See Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, the States, and the Right to Counsel, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467,
479 (2000).
106. Id. at 479-80.
107. Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Powell
Report] (quoting Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Address to the Ad Hoc Committee on
Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases (June 1988)).
108. Kappler, supra note 105, at 481 (citations omitted).
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to the imposition of a one-year limitations period on the time
for review was that "the system led to 'unnecessary delay and
repetition.'"1 ' Unnecessary delay, however, was predominately a
problem in capital cases.110 On the other hand, repetition was due
to a lack of communication between state and federal authorities
which resulted in state prisoners litigating and relitigating to
exhaust state remedies in order to properly bring claims in federal
court."1 This concern regarding repetition would not attach in the
context of federal prisoners pursuing their claims in federal courts
since there would be no state-level requirement of exhaustion.
Similarly, since there would be no need for state and federal
officials to communicate in reference to federal prisoners, the "lack
of communication" problem also would be nonexistent.
The effect of the AEDPA's one year limitation period on § 2255
does not seem to have played a big part in the debates concerning
habeas corpus reform. Perhaps this is because habeas corpus
occupies such a large place in Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and is
therefore susceptible to sweeping generalities as opposed to detailed
discussion. Democratic Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier from
Wisconsin gave the single longest monologue on the specific subject
of § 2255's one-year limitation:
There is no evidence that section 2255 motions are delayed in
the current system. This new procedural cutoff is simply not
needed.
The amendment also incorporates wholesale all the
restrictions contained in the original Powell Committee report,
but applies those restrictions in an entirely different context.
The Powell Committee focused exclusively on habeas corpus
proceedings involving State prisoners and did not recommend
that its plan should be adopted for section 2255 cases involving
prisoners convicted in Federal court. The same concerns for the
109. Id. (quoting Powell Report, supra note 107, at 3239). The two other problems
identified by the Committee were (1) the need for counsel for prisoners facing the death
penalty, and (2) petitions filed just before execution, which put a great deal of stress on the
judicial system. Id.
110. See Hoffman, supra note 90, at 65. Logically, a prisoner facing an extended stay in
mandatory, government-provided housing (i.e., prison) would want to get out in the shortest
amount of time possible, while a prisoner facing a death sentence would want to delay
receiving his ultimate punishment for as long as possible.
111. See Kappler, supra note 105, at 481.
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interests of the States are simply not present in this different
context.
1 2
When viewed in the context of the Powell Committee findings,
Representative Kastenmeier's remarks seem to have hit upon
something that other legislators either did not see or were not
willing, for political or other reasons, to address.
The reforms of the AEDPA may have been applicable to those
prisoners facing a death sentence. Congress overlegislated,
however, when it passed the new limitations imposed by the
AEDPA in the noncapital habeas corpus area, especially in relation
to federal noncapital habeas corpus prisoners. The result is a limit
on a prisoner's ability to receive justice with no significant
improvements to the overall efficiency of the system.11
D. History of Pertinent Cases
1. Gendron v. United States
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
when a judgment of conviction becomes final for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 2255 in Gendron v. United States."' Randall Gendron was
convicted in federal district court of "conspiracy to distribute and
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine."' 15 On October 8, 1996,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence and conviction, and on
October 25, 1996, the court denied his petition for rehearing and
issued the mandate on November 4, 1996. Gendron never filed a
petition of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court and
filed his § 2255 motion to vacate on November 18, 1997.16 The
district court fouuid that the judgment of conviction had become
112. 136 CONG. REc. 27,522 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (D-Wis.)) (referring
to the Gekas Amendment to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990 which proposed
a 90-day limitation period for § 2255 motions).
113. See Larry Yackle, Federal Habeas Corpus in a Nutshell, 28 HUM. RTS. 7, 7 (2001)
("{Tihe Supreme Court's restrictive doctrines and the additional limits established by the
AEDPA undermine the ability of federal courts to vindicate federal rights in habeas corpus
proceedings.n).
114. 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 673.
116. Id.
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final the day the circuit court had issued its mandate, November 4,
1996. Because Gendron filed his § 2255 motion more than one year
from that date, the district court held that the period of limitation
had expired and denied his petition.11 7
In his appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Gendron argued that the
one-year period should not have begun to run until after the ninety-
day period1 8 for filing a petition for certiorari had expired." 9 If
correct, Gendron would have had until January 25, 1998, to file his
motion to vacate, and his § 2255 motion would have been timely
filed in the district court.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit
rejected Gendron's analogy to the Supreme Court's definition of
when a conviction becomes final in the retroactivity context. 20
That definition, handed down in Griffith v. Kentucky, 2' stated: "By
'final,' we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a
petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally
denied." 122 Despite recognizing that "the Court's definition can be
used for guidance," the Seventh Circuit found that "Congress has
the authority to independently determine the standards to be
applied under §§ 2244 and 2255."'"
117. Id.
118. According to Supreme Court Rule 13:
1. Unless otherwise provided by law, a petition for a writ of certiorari to review
a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, entered by a state court of last resort
or a United States court of appeals ... is timely when it is filed with the Clerk
of this Court within 90 days after entry of the judgment.
3. The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry
of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date
of the mandate ....
Sup. CT. R. 13.
119. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 673.
120. Id. at 674.
121. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
122. Id. at 321 n.6. Griffith dealt with the retroactive application of the Court's decision
in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
123. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 governs determinations of finality for
writs of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the method by which prisoners in
custody pursuant to a state court judgment file federal habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. §
2244 (2000).
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The Seventh Circuit went on to compare the one-year periods of
limitation included in §§ 2244(d)(1)' 24 and 2255(1) in order to
understand the latter. Employing the Russello presumption, which
takes its name from Russello v. United States,"8 the court found
that because Congress had included language in § 2244(d)(1)(A)
that made it clear when a judgment of conviction became final, but
did not include the same language in § 2255," Congress must have
"intended to treat the period of limitation differently under the two
sections."127 The court concluded that in order to avoid rendering
the specific language in § 2244 pointless, the only reading possible
was that for "federal prisoners who decide not to seek certiorari
with the Supreme Court ... the period of limitation begin[s] to run
on the date this court issues the mandate in their direct criminal
appeal.""'8
124. Section 2244(dXl) reads:
(d() A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;
or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(dXl) (2000).
125. 464 U.S. 16 (1983). The Russello presumption of statutory interpretation is that
"[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.* Id. at 23 (quoting United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
126. The specific language of § 2244 states that the one-year period of limitation begins
to run from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.* 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000). On the other
hand, § 2255 simply states that the one-year period of limitation runs from "the date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
127. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674.
128. Id.
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2. Kapral v. United States
The Third Circuit was the second United States Court of Appeals
to take up the issue, in Kapral v. United States.129 On January 17,
1995, Michael Kapral pled guilty in federal district court to
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and evasion of federal income taxes.' On May
25, 1995, Kapral appealed his conviction to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, which affirmed on February 13, 1996."l' On April 29,
1997, Kapral filed his § 2255 motion to vacate sentence. 13 2 The
district court dismissed Kapral's motion with prejudice because it
found that the motion was filed after the one-year period of
limitations included in § 2255 had expired.13 3
In reversing the district court's decision, the Third Circuit
rejected each argument the lower court had accepted 134 as well as
the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Gendron.'35
Instead, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's definition of
"final" in Griffith,' congressional intent,3 7 and a comparison of
the language in § 2255(1) with that in § 2263(a).3" The court held
that, within § 2255, a judgment of conviction becomes final on "the
date on which the defendant's time for filing a timely petition for
certiorari review expires.' 3 9
129. 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 1999).
130. Id. at 567.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kapral v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 495, 496 (D.N.J. 1997).
134. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 568-71.
135. Id. at 573-77.
136. Id. at 571-72.
137. Id. at 572-73.
13S. Id. at 576-77. Section 2263(a) reads:
(a) Any application under this chapter [28 USCS §§ 2261 et seq.] for habeas
corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate district court
not later than 180 days after final State court affirmance of the conviction and
sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.
28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2001).
139. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 577.
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Between February and May of 2000, the Tenth,"40 Fifth,141 and
Ninth142 Circuits each issued opinions which almost exclusively
relied on or employed the rationale of Kapral.
3. United States v. Torres
At about the same time these three circuits were following
the Third Circuit's reasoning, the Fourth Circuit was also
addressing the issue in United States v. Torres.14' D'Andre Torres
was convicted of one charge of conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine on August 1, 1995. On May 19, 1997, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and issued its
mandate on June 10, 1997."' Torres did not file a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court, but did file his § 2255 motion to
vacate sentence on August 24, 1998. "" The district court found that
because his motion to vacate sentence had been filed more than one
year after the date the Fourth Circuit had issued its mandate on
Torres' direct appeal, the AEDPA statute of limitations barred the
motion.'"
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit
rejected the reasoning of Kapral, and, by extension, the other
decisions following Kapral. In doing so, the court accepted the
limited analysis of Gendron while also embarking on some of
its own analysis. The court noted that the extra language in
§ 2244(d)(1), expressly stating that a judgment of conviction
becomes final only after the time for seeking Supreme Court review
has expired, was missing in § 2255(1). The court found, therefore,
that Congress had intended to leave the extra language out of
§2255.147 Again, following the rationale of Gendron, Griffith's
interpretation of when a decision becomes final was rejected by the
Fourth Circuit." The court also noted that in § 2263(a), which
140. United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2000).
141. United States v. Gamble, 208 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2000).
142. United States v. Garcia, 210 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000).
143. 211 F.3d 836 (4th Cir. 2000).
144. Id. at 837.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 839.
148. Id. at 841.
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concerns time limitations for state prisoners serving sentences
for capital crimes, Congress included language like that in
§ 2244(d)(1). 149 The court presumed that Congress did not consider
the possibility of a federal defendant not filing a petition for
certiorari, '5 and noted that since nothing else happens after
issuance of a circuit court's mandate if the prisoner does not file a
petition for certiorari, the judgment must be "final" at that point.'51
E. Areas of Agreement
It is helpful to note not only where the courts disagree, but also
where they agree. All of the courts of appeals that have addressed
the issue have agreed that when a prisoner files a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court after his conviction and sentence
have been affirmed by the court of appeals, direct review concludes
when the Supreme Court either denies his petition or decides his
case on the merits." 2 In Torres, Judge Karen Williams wrote:
In our system of federal courts, it is generally accepted that, for
a defendant who files a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, the conclusion of direct review occurs when the Supreme
Court either denies his petition or decides his case on the
merits.""
So, to be clear, the disagreement in the circuits concerns only the
situation in which the prisoner, for whatever reason, does not file
a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
There also seems to exist some agreement that the wording of the
AEDPA leaves room for reasonable disagreement about exactly
when a decision becomes final for purposes of § 2255(1). In his
concurrence in Kapral, Judge Samuel Alito wrote that § 2255(1) "is
149. Id. at 840 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2000)).
150. Id. at 839.
151. Id.
152. See United States v. Green, 260 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001); Washington v. United States,
243 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. United States, 246 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Torres, 211 F.3d 836 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d
1005 (7th Cir. 2000); United Statesv. Willis, 202 F.3d 1279(10th Cir. 2000); Kapral v. United
States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 1999).
153. Torres, 211 F.3d at 839.
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susceptible to two entirely reasonable interpretations.... Indeed if
I were compelled to choose one interpretation based solely on the
text of that provision, I would find the choice exceedingly hard.
Moreover, I think that a reasonable legislator could easily choose
either interpretation."'" Other courts of appeals addressing this
issue have agreed with this statement. 55
II. ANALYSIS OF GENDRON, KAPRAL, AND TORRES
A. Inconsistency with Teague v. Lane '
1. Gendron
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Gendron, the Supreme Court has
already defined when a judgment of conviction becomes "final" in
the context of retroactive application of Supreme Court decisions to
cases receiving collateral review. 57 In Allen v. Hardy,"s the Court
stated: "'By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for
petition for certiorari had elapsed ...."" Allen came to the Court as
an appeal from a federal district court's rejection of petitioner's
petition for federal habeas corpus and a court of appeal's affirmance
of that rejection." ° Then, in Griffith v. Kentucky,' the Court took
154. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 577-7S (Alito, J., concurring).
155. See Burch, 202 F.3d at 1276 (Like the court in Kapral, we recognize that there are
several possible meanings of the word Snal' in this context."); Garcia, 210 F.3d at 1059 ("'e
phrase 'becomes final' is capable of at least two meanings.*); Torres, 211 F.3d at 844
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe phrase 'the date on which the judgment of conviction
becomes fmal' contained in § 2255(1) is ambiguous, as it is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations.").
156. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
157. See Gendron, 164 F.3d at 673-74.
158. 478 U.S. 255 (1986). Earl Allen, was convicted of murdering his girlfriend and her
brother by a jury during the selection of which the prosecutor had used nine of seventeen
peremptory challenges to remove seven blacks and two Hispanic potential jury members.
Allen petitioned the Court arguing that its decision in Batseon v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), which was pending when the court of appeals rejected his claims, should be applied
to his case. The Court rejected this argument and held that its decision in Batson would not
be applied on collateral review of cases that were final. Id at 257-58.
159. Id. at 258 n.1 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)).
160. Id. at 256-57.
161. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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up the issue of the retroactive application of its decisions to cases
pending on state or federal direct review and affirmed its previous
definition of "final."'62 Finally, in Teague v. Lane,"" the Court held,
as Allen had previously held, that its decisions are not retroactively
applicable on collateral review to convictions that have become
final.6 4 The Court thus affirmed its definition of when a judgment
of conviction becomes final from both Allen and Griffith.6 ' The
Seventh Circuit rejected this definition from Allen, Griffith, and
Teague, concluding that, though the Supreme Court's definition
provided guidance, Congress was completely free to disregard the
Court's definition and adopt its own because "'[wle start with the
assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate
the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal
law. '" 166
In fact, one can conclude that Congress "articulated" the § 2255
definition of when a judgment of conviction becomes final only by
using a very strained definition of the word "articulate." Webster's
defines the verb "articulate," as employed by the Seventh Circuit,
as (1) "to utter distinctly" or (2) "to give clear and effective
utterance to: to put into words."6 7 The Seventh Circuit suggested
that Congress "articulated" the "appropriate" definition of "final" for
§ 2255 by including more specific language in § 2244 and excluding
that same language from § 2255. The Seventh Circuit's suggestion
162. Id. at 321 n.6 (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982)) ("By
'final,' we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability
of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for
certiorari finally denied.").
163. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In Teague, the Court held that (1) retroactivity is an initial,
threshold question because fairness requires that a new rule be applied to all those similarly
situated to the defendant when the rule was handed down, and (2) a new constitutional rule
of criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively unless (a) "it places 'certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe [,J' or (b) "it requires the observance of 'those procedures ... implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.' Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
692 (1971); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
164. Id. at 296. The Third Circuit correctly summarized this holding in Kapral: "For
purposes of a Teague analysis, a defendant's judgment of conviction becomes fmial (1) on the
date the Supreme Court denies certiorari ... or (2) on the date the time for filing a timely
petition for a writ of certiorari expires." Kapral, 166 F.3d at 572 (citations omitted).
165. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295.
166. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).
167. WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 65 (10th ed. 1993).
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that Congress can "put into words" a concept by not putting it into
words defies the definition of "articulate" and common sense.
Moreover, Milwaukee v. Illinois,6 1 the case the Seventh Circuit
cited for its "articulation principle," illustrates that the principle is
not applicable to the § 2255 controversy. In Milwaukee, the Court
addressed whether the federal common law of nuisance, which it
had previously stated governed the dispute between several
municipal corporations of the state of Wisconsin and the state of
Illinois concerning sewage discharge into Lake Michigan, had been
preempted by Congress's passage of the 1972 Amendments to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.' 9 The question was not the
definition of a term used by Congress, or methods of statutory
interpretation, but whether Congress had legislated on the question
at all. 170 Statutory interpretation is a courts' attempt to determine
what Congress meant by the language it used in a certain statute.
Federal common law is federal judge-made law in the absence of a
federal statute. In Milwaukee, the issue was one of preemption, not
one of interpretation and the case thus is not appropriate for
analogy to the § 2255 question.
Finally, as the Third Circuit pointed out in Kapral, the Seventh
Circuit's logic would mean that a petitioner's limitation period for
filing a § 2255 motion would begin to run ninety days before the
petitioner's case became final for purposes of Teague.17' The
Supreme Court could announce a new rule under this that would
provide the petitioner with the basis of a claim on collateral review
at the end of a prisoner's window in which he may petition for
certiorari. Under the Gendron logic the petitioner would only have
nine months to file his § 2255 motion. This defies, as the Third
Circuit pointed out, "the orderly administration of direct and
collateral proceedings. 172 There is no reason to work such an
168. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
169. Id. at 312-14.
170. Id.
171. Kapral, 168 F.3d at 572. Also, using the Seventh Circuit's logic, no court would be
able to say whether the § 2255 limitation period had begun running when the court of
appeals confirmed the petitioner's judgment of conviction until the ninety-day period for
petitioning for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court had expired. This is because the
running of the statute would depend on the future action or inaction of the petitioner, i.e.
whether or not he or she timely filed for a writ of certiorari.
172. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 572.
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-injustice on a § 2255 petitioner, particularly when state petitioners
subject to § 2244 are not under such time constraints."'
The Seventh Circuit did not address the effects of the
inconsistency of its definition with the definition of "final" as
employed by a Teague retroactivity analysis. The Seventh
Circuit can point to no affirmative evidence that this inefficient
scheme is what Congress intended, only conclusions based upon
presumption. 17 4
2. Torres
In Torres, the Fourth Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit, did
address the question of whether there ought to be consistency with
Teague in § 2255. It concluded that "there is no necessary reason to
conclude that Congress intended to import the judicially created
concept of finality for purposes of a Teague retroactivity analysis
into the context of the limitation periods of either § 2244 or §
2255."175 The court went on to say that even if Congress did include
language consistent with Teague, it was contained in § 2244(d)(1)
and absent in § 2255(1).17' The court concluded that Congress,
therefore, must have intentionally made § 2255(1) different.1 77
Various portions of the Fourth Circuit's argument illustrate the
convenient characterizations that the Fourth Circuit employed to
173. This would mean that, in the situation where the Supreme Court issued a new rule
after the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, a petitioner convicted under
a federal drug statute would receive less time to file his § 2255 motion than a state petitioner
convicted of a state drug felony.
174. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674 (discussing the Russello presumption).
175. Torres, 211 F.3d at 841.
176. Id.
177. In an unpublished opinion, United States v. Walker, No. 97-7854, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 35975, decided a little over a year before the Torres decision, the Fourth Circuit
vacated and remanded District Court Judge Rebecca Beach Smith's order dismissing the
petitioner's § 2255 motion as untimely because it was filed after the one-year period of
limitation had expired. The district court found that the petitioner's judgment of conviction
became final on the date the appeals court affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Fourth
Circuit, in overturning the decision, specifically referred to Teague in holding that direct
review does not end until the time for filing a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court
expires. In Torres, the Fourth Circuit completely reversed itself, illustrating the
disagreement and confusion that surrounds this issue. Torres, however, has become the law
of the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
70 U.S.L.W. 3339 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2001) (No. 01-6715).
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reach its result, and the pitfalls of relying exclusively upon
presumptions. Alternating between informed and uninformed
legislators, the Fourth Circuit stated that "Congress was pre-
suimably aware that a federal defendant's judgment of conviction
becomes final for purposes of collateral attack at the conclusion
of direct review[,]" 17' but that "Congress almost certainly did not
consider the situation in which a federal defendant, upon the
affirmance of his conviction by a court of appeals, exercises his
prerogative not to file a petition for certiorari."179 The court
concluded that Congress possessed knowledge about one thing, but
not about another. The reason the court presumed that Congress
knew when a judgment of conviction becomes final was because
that knowledge "is generally accepted,"'80 i.e., it is common, public
knowledge within the federal court system. No reason is given as to
why Congress would not consider the prisoner who fails to exercise
his right to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court after
affirmance by the court of appeals. The most probable conclusion to
be drawn from this lack of reasoning is that the Fourth Circuit is
really saying that because it would not have considered that
situation, Congress must not have considered it either.18
178. Id. at 839.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. At least one lower court has already expanded the holding of Torres. In United States
v. Sherrod, 123 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Va. 2000), Judge Rebecca Beach Smith denied the
defendant's motion to extend time to file a § 2255 motion. Judge Smith concluded that the
logic of Torres also applies when a defendant fails to appeal the district court's conviction to
the appellate court. Because Sherrod did not appeal his district court conviction to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, his conviction became final and the one-year period of limitation
began on the day the district court entered its decision. Therefore, Sherrod was not entitled
to the ten-day period, beginning when the district court enters its judgment or order, within
which Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(bX1) provides that criminal defendants can file
their appeal. Id. at 339.
In Sherrod's case, starting the one-year period of limitation from the date of the district
court's judgment as opposed to ten days later made all the difference. The district court
entered judgment against Sherrod on October 28, 1999. Id. The district court received his
motion for a time extension on November 8, 2000, although the prison stamped the letter for
processing on November 6, 2000. Id. at 338-39 & n.1. Without the ten days, Sherrod was
required to file his § 2255 motion by October 28, 2000. With the ten days, Sherrod would
have been required to file his motion by November 7, 2000. Under the "prison mailbox rule,"
a pro se petitioner, which Sherrod evidently was, is deemed to have filed with the clerk of
court on the day prisoner officials receive the prisoner's letter to mail. Houston v. Lack, 487
U.S. 266, 273-74 (1988). Houston is cited with approval in Thompson v. E.I. DuPont de
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3. Summary
Regarding the question of why Congress would choose to ignore
the previously existing Teague definition of when a judgment of
conviction becomes final, the arguments advanced by both the
Seventh and Fourth Circuits are filled with holes. The Seventh
Circuit failed to address the inconsistency and inefficiency created
by the interplay of the definition of final already used in a Teague
retroactivity analysis and its own interpretation. Furthermore,
while it may be Congress's responsibility to articulate the proper
federal standards to be applied, it is only by using a very strained
definition of "articulate" that one can conclude that Congress did so
in this instance. Furthermore, the case the Seventh Circuit cites for
this proposition is taken completely out of context. The Fourth
Circuit, on the other hand, maintained its position by alternating
between presumptions that Congress was informed and pre-
sumptions that it was uninformed. Both circuits' arguments suffer
from flaws that make their conclusions regarding the definition of
when a judgment of conviction becomes final untenable.
B. Comparison of§§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1)
1. The Russello Presumption and the "Negative Inference"
Both the Seventh and Fourth Circuits relied heavily on the
difference in language between §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1). The
Seventh Circuit invoked the Russello presumption to explain this
Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 1996) and numerous other unpublished Fourth Circuit
opinions. If Sherrod had been given the ten-day filing period under Rule 4(bX1), the
November 6, 2000 stamp for processing would have meant that he filed his motion for an
extension of time one day before the November 7, 2000 deadline.
Other courts have specifically held that a § 2255 motion is considered filed the instant
prison officials receive it for mailing. See Morales-Rivera v. United States, 184 F.3d 109 (1st
Cir. 1999); United States v. Gray, 182 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 1999); Adams v. United States, 173
F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 1999); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Hatala, 29 F. Supp. 2d 728 (N.D. W. Va. 1998); see also Grady v. United States, 269 F.3d 913
(8th Cir. 2001) (assuming that the prisoner mailbox rule applies to § 2255 motions and
remanding case to the district court to make factual determinations regarding when the
prisoner put his § 2255 motion in the prison mail system); Simmons v. Ghent, 970 F.2d 392
(7th Cir. 1992) (assuming that the prisoner mailbox rule applies to all prisoner district court
filings).
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difference. 2 The Fourth Circuit, perhaps because it had seen the
response from other circuits to the invocation of the Russello
presumption, did not explicitly refer to that presumption. Instead,
the Fourth Circuit simply stated that the exclusion of the specifying
language in § 2244(d)(1) from § 2255(1) "provides a powerful
negative inference" that Congress did not intend the period of
limitation to run from the expiration of a prisoner's time to file for
certiorari. " Although this does not state the principle as absolutely
as the Seventh Circuit did, the difference is without distinction.
Both courts meant that because Congress included language in one
section and left it out of a second, the second section cannot have
the same meaning as the first. Both lead to the conclusion "that
Congress intended to treat the period of limitation differently under
the two sections. 184
Conversely, other courts have found that § 2244, which provides
the limitation period provision of § 2254, and § 2255 are virtually
identical and that the difference in language should have no sig-
nificant effect on the interpretation of either section. " Additionally,
in Reed v. Farley,8 ' the Supreme Court stated that at least where
mere statutory violations are at issue, "'§ 2255 was intended to
mirror § 2254 in operative effect.' 18 7 Therefore, in the absence of a
clear indication from Congress, the limitation period governing each
should be given the same operative effect.
182. Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1998).
183. United States v. Torres, 211 F.3d 836, 840 (4th Cir. 2000).
184. Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674.
185. United States v. Kapral, 166 F.3d 565, 574 (3d Cir. 1999) ('[Flederal inmates who
wish to file motions ... under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must adhere to a one-year period of limitation
virtually identical to that of§ 2244(d)(1)."') (quoting Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.
1998)); Then v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 2d 727, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("The difference in
language is not meaningful, as section 2255 simply omits the definition of Imal' without
providing any alternative definition.").
186. 513 U.S. 339 (1994).
187. Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344 (1974)) ([N]o microscopic
reading of§ 2255 can escape ... the unambiguous legislative history showing that § 2255 was
intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect," in determining whether the petitioner's claim
was cognizable under § 2255).
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a. Poor Draftsmanship of the AEDPA
There is a more basic problem with the use of the Russello
presumption."' The Russello presumption is predicated upon the
premise that statutes are carefully drafted,189 and the AEDPA was
not carefully drafted. "A well-drafted statute should reduce the
frequency of disputes about interpretation,"' 90 which the AEDPA
has not done. InLindh v. Murphy,19' the Supreme Court stated that
"in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the [AEDPA] is not a silk
purse of the art of statutory drafting."19 Legal commentators have
reached the same conclusion. 193 Even proponents of the legislation
admit that the AEDPA is poorly drafted.' 9
Indeed, the history of the Russello presumption supports the
fact that it is based on a presumption of careful draftsmanship.
In FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., ' the first case to employ
the doctrine, the Supreme Court, interpreting § 2 of the Clayton
Act, stated that it could not "supply what Congress has
studiously omitted."9" Simply put, the presumption should not be
applied to a statute that was poorly drafted.
b. Vagaries of the Legislative Process
The Supreme Court has employed the "negative inference"
reasoning used by the Fourth Circuit in Torres. Specifically, in
Lindh v. Murphy,97 the Court addressed the retroactive effect of
Chapters 153 and 154 of the AEDPA. The Court found that because
188. This Note characterizes the *negative inference" language used by the Fourth Circuit
as essentially the same as the Russeilo presumption. Therefore, an analysis of one is an
analysis of the other.
189. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 579 (Alito, J., concurring).
190. SINGER, supra note 14, § 45:02, at 15.
191. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
192. Id. at 336.
193. See Yackle, supra note 87, at 381 ("[The AEDPAJ is not well drafted.").
194. Marcia Coyle, Law: Innocent Dead Men WalkingF, NAT'L L. J., May 20, 1996, at Al
(quoting Kent Scheidegger, of the conservative Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, a
proponent of the AEDPA as saying, "I don't think [the AEDPA] was well drafted....").
195. 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
196. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
197. 521 U.S. 320, 327-30 (1997).
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§ 107(c)' 98 provided that "Chapter 154 ... shall apply to cases
pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act,"'99 there was
an implicit inference "that the amendments to chapter 153 were
assumed and meant to apply to the general run of habeas cases only
when those cases had been filed after the date of the Act."" 0 The
Court reasoned that because "it was only after [chapters 153 and
154] had been joined together and introduced as a single bill in
the Senate ... that ... § 107(c) was added[, [both chapters ... had
to have been in mind when § 107(c) was added."20' Therefore,
"[niothing ... but a different intent explains [with regard to
chapters] the different treatment [of the chapters]."20 2 Justice
Souter, author of the majority opinion, stated, however, that this
may not always be true:
This might not be so if, for example, the two chapters had
evolved separately in the congressional process, only to be
passed together at the last minute, after chapter 154 had
already acquired the mandate to apply it to pending cases.
Under those circumstances, there might have been a real
possibility that Congress would have intended the same rule of
application for each chapter, but in the rough-and-tumble no one
had thought of being careful about chapter 153, whereas
someone else happened to think of inserting a provision in
chapter 154.203
The origin of the language in §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1) is
analogous to the situation Souter imagined. First, the language
in §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1) originated in separate Senate
bills introduced several months apart." ' Second, the bills were
198. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107(c), 110
Stat. 1226 (1996).
199. Lindh, 621 U.S. at 327.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 330.
202. Id. at 329.
203. Id. at 329-30.
204. See Kapral, 166 F.3d at 580 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the history of the
Comprehensive Terrorism Protection Act of 1995). At the start of the 104th Congress,
Senator Dole introduced Senate Resolution 3, The Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995, which would have amended § 2255 to include the
"'date on which the judgment of conviction becomes fmal" language which is the same as the
current § 2255(1). Id. (quoting S. Res. 3, 104th Cong. (1995)). The bill would also have
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introduced by different Senators. 5 Third, there is little or no
legislative history concerning these provisions.2 "' And finally, the
bill that Congress eventually enacted as the AEDPA, Senate
Resolution 735, was introduced slightly more than a week after the
Oklahoma City bombing, when emotions were running high.20 7
Along with the survivor letters that were introduced during the
debate, 08 this timing supports a conclusion that there was
significant "rough-and-tumble" present during the discussion of the
bill.20 9 The legislative history does not indicate that "a thoughtful
Member of the Congress was most likely to have intended just what
the later reader sees by inference. 210 Rather, it fits the Lindh
Court's exception to the "negative inference" presumption.2
amended § 2244, with different language ("the date on which State remedies are exhausted ' )
from that which is currently in § 2244(dX 1). Id. Later that year, Senators Specter and Hatch
sponsored Senate Resolution 623, the Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1995, which differed
from Senate Resolution 3 in that it amended § 2244 with the language "the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review.' Id. (quoting S. Res. 623, 104th Cong. (1995)). Then, eight days after
the Oklahoma City bombing, Senator Dole introduced Senate Resolution 735, the
Comprehensive Terrorism Protection Act of 1995. It included the same language as Senate
Resolution 623 for both state and federal prisoners and was passed without any significant
changes. Id. at 581 (discussing S. Res. 735, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted) and citing the
remarks of several Senators).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 581 n.3 ("No house or Senate Report was submitted, and the Conference
Report contained only one brief reference to this provision.').
207. See id. at 581.
208. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
209. The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged, in the context of the AEDPA, that
"rough-and-tumble," and not Congressional intent, may explain some word choice in statutes.
Lindh, 521 U.S. at 320, 329.
210. Id. at 330.
211. Other scholars seem to conclude, as does this Note, that Souter's discussion in Lindh
is particularly appropriate for § 2255:
[The AEDPA bears the influence of various bills that were fiercely debated for
nearly forty years. Along the way, proponents of habeas legislation adjusted
their initiatives in light of contemporaneous events and circumstances: the
Powell Committee Report in 1989, for example, as well as shifting levels of
political support for particular measures and new Supreme Court decisions on
point. Proponents often kept abreast of the times by adding new elements to
their bills without, at the same time, reexamining old formulations in order to
maintain an intellectually coherent whole. The result, I am afraid, is
extraordinary arcane verbiage that will require considerable time and resources
to sort out.
Yackle, supra note 87, at 381.
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The Russello presumption, although perhaps a useful statutory
interpretation tool in certain circumstances, is not appropriately
used in an analysis of when a judgment of conviction becomes
final for purposes of § 2255. First, the presumption itself is
based upon a presumption of good draftsmanship, which, as the
Supreme Court, commentators, and supporters have concluded, is
inappropriate in regard to the AEDPA. Second, the situation
described in Lindh, in which a negative inference drawn from a
comparison of two separate sections of the same act would be
inappropriate according to the Supreme Court, is exactly what took
place with the language of §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1).
2. The Difference Between State and Federal Petitioners
The Third Circuit concluded correctly that the statute of
limitations on § 2255 motions does not begin to run until the time
to file a petition for certiorari has passed, but its analysis too was
flawed. The Third Circuit's comparison of §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255 in
Kapral proceeds from the presumption that there is "no principled
reason to treat state and federal habeas petitioners differently."212
An analysis of either § 2244 or § 2255, therefore, should produce the
same results. Specifically, the court found the term "direct review,"
included in § 2244(d)(1), particularly helpful. In Barefoot v.
Estelle,2 1 the Supreme Court wrote that for a state prisoner, "the
process of direct review..., if a federal question is involved, includes
the right to petition this Court for a writ of certiorari."21' The Third
Circuit concluded that if this is true for state prisoners and
Congress did not intend to treat them any differently than federal
prisoners, then the same must be true for federal prisoners.215 The
court did acknowledge the absence in § 2255 of § 2244's "clarifying
language," but concluded that the absence was not significant
212. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 575. But see Josephine R. Poluto, The Federal Prisoner Collateral
Attack: Requiescat in Pace, 1988 BYU L. REV. 37, 40 n.15 (explaining why disparate
treatment of state and federal prisoners' collateral attacks has not been "foreclosed" and why
the appropriate comparison is not between federal § 2255 motions and state prisoner habeas
corpus motions, but between § 2255 motions and federal prisoner habeas corpus motions).
213. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
214. Id. at 887.
215. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 575.
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enough to overcome the presumption that Congress intended to
treat state and federal prisoners the same.216
There is, however, at least one reason to treat state and federal
prisoners differently with respect to the one-year period of
limitation. As Representative Kastenmeier pointed out, the Powell
Committee report, one of the most recent catalysts for habeas
corpus reform,217 did not address federal prisoners, but focused
exclusively on state prisoners.2 "8 The Report's conclusion that dealt
with time limits specifically referred to the problem of "unnecessary
delay and repetition"2 9 that existed within the state system and did
not mention federal prisoners. If, in fact, the problem only existed
at the state level, then there would indeed be a "principled reason"
to treat state and federal prisoners differently; namely, that the
problem of delay that Congress meant to address by including a
period of limitation in § 2255 did not exist for federal prisoners. In
essence, Congress included a fix, § 2255's period of limitation, for a
procedure that was not broken.
Although the Third Circuit may have been correct that Congress
did not intend to treat state and federal habeas petitioners
differently, it was incorrect to conclude that there is no reason to
treat state and federal petitioners differently. The reason that they
should be treated differently, specifically in the context of periods
of limitation, is that the concerns which prompted the call for a
period of limitation, the delay and repetition caused by the
exhaustion requirement, did not exist for federal petitioners, but
only for state petitioners.' This justification for different
treatment, however, supports the Third Circuit's ultimate con-
clusion that, for federal petitioners, a judgment of conviction
becomes final when the time for filing for a writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court expires. If the problem promoting the adoption
of a period of limitation did not exist for federal petitioners, then
certainly the period of limitation provision should not be construed
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. The Oklahoma City bombing was the
other major catalyst. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 109.
220. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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even more strictly against them than the provision governing state
petitioners.
C. Comparison of§§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1) with § 2263(a)
1. The Third Circuit's Approach
Congress enacted § 2263(a) under Chapter 154 of Title 28 of the
AEDPA, which governs capital sentence-serving state prisoners'
habeas petitions filed in states that comply with the require-
ments set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2261. The Third Circuit also argued
that a comparison of the language in § 2263 with the language of
§§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1) supported its view that the one-year
period of limitation in § 2255 begins to run only after the time
for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court has
expired.22' Specifically, the court pointed to the "use of 'State
court' [in § 2263] to modify the well-settled meaning of direct
review (which includes the right to seek review in the Supreme
Court) ...." Because neither §§ 2244(d)(1) nor 2255(1) modify the
meaning of direct review at all, the Third Circuit concluded that
Congress's intent was to exclude the time a defendant has to seek
certiorari to the Supreme Court from the final year-long limit on his
right to file for a writ of habeas corpus.
223
Furthermore, § 2263 begins the period of limitation before a
petition for certiorari is filed, but also provides that the period will
be tolled if a petition is filed.22' Sections 2244 and 2255 do not
contain analogous tolling provisions.225 The Third Circuit concluded
"that Congress did not mention tolling in § 2244 or § 2255 because
Congress assumed tolling was unnecessary since it did not intend
221. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 577. 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) reads: "Any application under this
chapter ... for habeas corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the appropriate
district court not later than 180 days after final State court aflirmance of the conviction and
sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2263(a) (2001).
222. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 576.
223. Id.
224. See 28 U.S.C. § 2263(bXl) (2001).
225. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2001).
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the limitations period to begin until after the time for certiorari
review expired.""'
The flaws in these arguments can be found in the Third Circuit's
own reasoning. When addressing the Seventh Circuit's argument,
the court stated: "[The difference between the wording of
§ 2244(d)(1) and § 2255 could simply be the result of imprecise
draftsmanship, and not at all an expression of congressional
intent."227 Certainly, the same poor draftsmanship could explain
the difference between the language of §§ 2244 and 2255 and that
of § 2263. Essentially, the Third Circuit seems to assume poor
draftsmanship when addressing the arguments based upon the
language of the statute posed by the Seventh Circuit, but assumes
careful drafting when putting forth its own language-based
argument.
Not only does the tolling provision argument suffer from the
same shaky assumption of a clear purpose and intent based
upon language of an act that is admittedly poorly written, but
the argument also proceeds from the assumption that there is no
principled reason to treat state and federal prisoners differently
concerning their time periods for review. 22' As previously stated,
there is a principled reason to treat state and federal prisoners
differently; namely, the lack of "unnecessary delay and repeti-
tion"129 at the federal level that existed at the state level. 230
2. The Fourth Circuit's Approach
Oddly enough, in Torres the Fourth Circuit was able to use the
same comparison of § 2255 with § 2263 to support a conclusion
opposite from that of the Third Circuit. First, the court noted
another difference in language between the sections.231 In § 2263(a),
Congress expanded the time period before the limitation period
would begin, including "the expiration of the time for seeking
226. Kapral, 166 F.3d at 577.
227. Id. at 575 n.7.
228. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Section 2263 governs state prisoners'
petitions while § 2255 governs federal prisoners' petitions.
229. Sie supra note 111 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
231. Torres, 211 F.3d at 840.
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[direct] review."2"2 Section 2255 does not include this language
allowing a prisoner to file for relief during the "time for seeking
such review" even if he does not choose to seek such review. 233
Second, the court noted that § 2263(b)(1) provides for tolling only if
the prisoner files a petition for certiorari, but the dispute about §
2255 pertains only to those prisoners who do not file a petition for
certiorari.23' The court concluded that these distinctions mean that
§ 2263 therefore provides "no reliable guidance"235 for interpreting
§ 2255.
The Fourth Circuit's very different interpretation rests, like the
Third Circuit's interpretation, squarely on drawing a negative
inference from inclusion of language in one part of the AEDPA and
its absence in another. 6 The legislative history of the AEDPA, or
rather the lack of any legislative history pertaining to the specifics
of the language included in §§ 2244, 2255, or 2263, 7 the evolution
of the statute in Congress,28 and the virtually universal conclusion
that the Act was poorly drafted 9 are strong evidence that the
inclusion or exclusion of particular language from any part of the
AEDPA may not stem from any specific intent on Congress's part.
Courts should avoid the mistake that both the Third and Fourth
Circuits made and not rely solely on the text of § 2255 to guide
them in applying the statute of limitations on filing for § 2255
relief.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
233. Torres, 211 F.3d at 840 n.9.
234. Id. at 840.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 840 n.9; see also note 181 and accompanying text.
237. The Conference Committee Report, H.R. CON?. REP. No. 104-518 (1996), did not
modify §§ 101-108 of the AEDPA, which included the sections adding the limitation period
to §§ 2244 and 2255, because the Senate and House bills were identical. Besides
Representative Kastenmeier's statement, supra note 112, which was made five years before
final passage of the AEDPA, no discussion, debate, or report even tangentially touched the
specific language of the limitation period additions.
238. See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 192-94.
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III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT-DUNCAN V. WALKER 240
With the recognition that there is a genuine disagreement at
the federal appeals court level, the next question is what the
Supreme Court will do if and when they decide to hear the issue.241
Perhaps the Court's most telling decision thus far is Duncan v.
Walker,242 in which the Court addressed the issue of whether a
federal habeas corpus petition was an "application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).2' " Section 2244(d)(2) provides: "The time during
which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under
this subsection."2 ' The State of New York argued that "State" in
§ 2244 modifies the whole phrase "post-conviction or other collateral
review."2' Conversely, Walker argued that "State" applied only to
"post-conviction" and, therefore, "other collateral review" en-
compassed federal as well as state review. 246
240. 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
241. The Court has recently reviewed a similar question in Carey v. Saffold, 122 S. Ct.
2134 (2002). Section 2244(dX2) of Title 28 states that the time during which an application
for state collateral review is pending is not included in the one-year federal habeas corpus
period of limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(dX2) (2000). California urged that "pending" did not
include the time during which a lower court issues its decision and a notice of appeal is
timely filed with a state appellate court. Carey, 122 S. Ct. at 2138. The Court held that (1)
California's interpretation would require federal courts to contend with habeas petitions that
are in one sense unlawful (because the claims have not been exhausted) but in another sense
required by law (because they would otherwise be barred by the one-year statute of
limitations). Id. at 2138.
242. 533 U.S. 107 (2001). Sherman Walker was convicted of several robberies; his last
conviction was afflred on June 12, 1995, and became final in April of 1996, but before the
AEDPA's April 24,1996 effective date. On April 10, 1996, Walker filed a petition for federal
habeas corpus, which the district court dismissed without prejudice in July of 1996. On May
20, 1997, Walker filed a second federal habeas petition. The district court ruled that the
petition was not timely because it had been filed more than one year after the AEDPA's
effective date. The Second Circuit reversed, stating that the first habeas petition that was
pending "had tolled because it was an application for 'other collateral review' within the
meaning of§ 2244(dX2)[,]" the limitation period and, therefore, Walker's second petition was
timely. Id. at 171 (discussing the Second Circuit's analysis).
243. Id. at 169.
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(dX2) (2000).
245. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 172.
246. Id.
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In ruling for New York that "State" modified both "post-
conviction" and "other collateral review," Justice O'Connor began
with the language of § 2244(d)(2).247 She noted that although
Congress did include the modifier "State," it had not specified any
type of federal review that would fall within "other collateral
review." ' This was important to the majority because in several
other sections of the AEDPA Congress had expressly denoted some
review "State' and other review 'Federal."249 Justice O'Connor then
invoked the Russello presumption to conclude that when Congress
left out a word, in this case "Federal," the Court would not infer
that Congress meant to include it.2" She wrote that any other
construction "would render the word 'State' insignificant, if not
wholly superfluous."21
This use of the Russello presumption in construing the language
of the AEDPA might suggest that the Court would side with the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits and hold that, if the federal prisoner
does not file for a writ of certiorari, the one year period of limitation
begins when the federal appeals court issues its mandate. There
are, however, two important aspects of Justice O'Connor's opinion
that suggest the opposite. First, the majority named many
examples of Congress's ability to use both "State" and "Federal" in
other provisions of the AEDPA when they wanted the absence of
"Federal" in § 2244(d)(2) to be telling.252 These many examples
support the conclusion that Congress intentionally left out the word
"Federal," and did not simply poorly draft § 2244.= The conclusion
of congressional intent as opposed to drafting error finds further
support in "the fact that the words 'State' and 'Federal' are likely to
be of no small import when Congress drafts a statute that governs
247. Id.
248. Id. at 172-73.
249. Id. Justice O'Connor cited 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) as an example: "The ineffectiveness or
incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall
not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254." I& at 172. Other
examples she gave were 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261(e) and 2264(aX3). Id. at 173.
250. Id. (citing Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
251. Id. at 174.
252. The majority wrote: "We find no likely explanation for Congress' omission of the word
"Federal" in § 2244(dX2) other than that Congress did not intend properly filed applications
for federal review to toll the limitation period." Id. at 173.
253. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
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federal collateral review of state court judgments."'25 The phrase at
issue in the § 2255 cases is not necessarily susceptible to this
conclusion of careful drafting.
In contrast to the relevant § 2244 language, there are few
examples of Congress's decision to include or exclude the § 2255(1)
modifying phrase "by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review" in the code. Only the
amendments to § 2244(d)(1)(A), one of the provisions at issue, and
§ 2263(a) use this language.21 5 This provides very weak support for
concluding that the difference in language between §§ 2244(d)(1)
and 2255(1) is attributable to congressional intent rather than
congressional mistake.
Furthermore, the language at issue does not have the importance
of that at issue in Duncan. The reasoning in Duncan emphasized
the fact that the words "State" and "Federal" were important to
the statute as a whole."' By contrast, the pertinent language in
§§ 2244(d)(1) and 2255(1) is not important throughout the AEDPA
as a whole. A majority of the AEDPA addresses areas other than
habeas corpus reform."' Even specifically regarding habeas corpus
reform, the legislative history reveals that Congress did not give
§ 2255 much consideration.258
Additionally, at least two members of the Court disagreed with
the majority's use of the Russello presumption in ascertaining the
meaning of § 2244(d)(2), and they could have their way in a § 2255
case. In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that looking to other parts
of the statute where Congress expressly used "State" and "Federal"
did not automatically lead to the conclusion that the difference
254. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 173-74. The majority also wrote that it was unwilling to treat
"State" as "surplusage," particularly "when the term occupies so pivotal a place in the
statutory scheme as does the word 'State' in the federal habeas statute." Id. at 174.
255. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. 1,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
256. See supra notes 249-52.
257. Other areas addressed by the AEDPA include victim restitution, prohibitions on
international terrorism, terrorist and criminal alien removal and exclusion, nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons restrictions, and assistance to law enforcement. See
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. 1, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
258. See supra text accompanying note 209.
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must be attributed to congressional intent.' Instead, "the
'argument from neighbors' shows only that Congress might have
spoken more clearly than it did. It cannot prove the statutory
point."' Instead of relying on canons of statutory construction, the
dissent would have relied on the purpose of the ambiguous
provision.
26 1
In sum, although use of the Russello presumption by the majority
in Duncan might lead one to believe that the Supreme Court would
side with the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in deciding the § 2255
dispute, a closer look at the Court's reasoning finds that those
arguments which the Court used to support its reasoning in Duncan
are absent in the dispute about when a judgment of conviction
becomes final for purposes of § 2255(1). Moreover, there are at least
two Justices who see the approach of relying almost exclusively on
canons of statutory construction as misplaced and dangerous. They
would rely, instead, on the purpose behind the statute.
The disagreement between the majority and dissent illustrates
the radically different approaches that Supreme Court Justices use
to interpret statutory language. 26 2 The majority opinion represents
the formalist or textualist method, looking only at the text of the
statute to discern its meaning." The dissent represents the
functionalist method, looking behind the language to the purpose
and intent of Congress. 26' The Court's current composition and
259. Justice Breyer was joined by Justice Ginsburg. At least two Justices, therefore,
believed "that neither the statute's language, nor the application of canons of construction,
is sufficient to resolve the problem.' Duncan, 533 U.S. at 189.
260. Id. at 188. In addressing the use of "linguistic canons to dispel the uncertainties
caused by ambiguity," Justice Breyer wrote that "[wlhere statutory language is ambiguous,
I believe these priorities are misplaced. Language, dictionaries, and canons, unilluminated
by purpose, can lead courts into blind alleys, producing rigid interpretations that can harm
those whom the statute affects." Id. at 193. This is exactly what has happened in the Seventh
and Fourth Circuits.
261. Id.
262. See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation:
Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 539,541 (2001) (describing the
formalist and non-formalist approaches as "fundamentally different methods of
interpretation").
263. See id.
264. See id. The five Justices who most frequently use the textualist, formalist method
(O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) made up the majority in Duncan. The
concurrences and dissent were composed of the four Justices who most frequently use the
non-formalist or functionalist, approach (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg). It would
20021
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
previous decisions indicate that a strictly textual, formalist
approach may prevail. An honest look at and recognition of the
problems in the drafting of the AEDPA, its history and context, and
the key differences between the words at issue in § 2255 and those
addressed by prior decisions like Duncan, however, should persuade
a majority that a rigid textual approach is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
Simply invoking a statutory canon and following it blindly to its
conclusion is not the proper way to deal with a problematic question
of statutory interpretation,2 5 especially when it involves a right as
precious as petitioning for habeas corpus, to which a § 2255 motion
provides the equivalent.66 Courts on both sides of the issue have
been able to employ competing canons and arrive at diametrically
opposed conclusions. This fact alone lends support to the conclusion
that, in this context, statutory canons do not yield a definitive
answer.
The courts of appeals' decisions on this subject provide a clear
example of the problems that presumptions can create. The Seventh
Circuit concluded in Gendron26 7 that Congress ignored the Supreme
Court's Griffith definition of finality and created its own. The Third
Circuit, in Kapral, disagreed, finding from the text that Congress
had not intended to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
definition of finality.
The Fourth Circuit's Torres case provides another clear example
of conflicting presumptions and the problems they create. The
court concluded that Congress "almost certainly" did not take
into consideration a federal defendant who decides not to file a
not be surprising to see a 5-4 split when, and if, the Court takes up the definition of "final"
in § 2255.
265. See SINGER, supra note 14, § 45:02, at 12-13 ("Difficult questions of statutory
interpretation ought not be decided by the bland invocation of abstract jurisprudential
maxims,.).
266. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
267. In Clay v. United States, No. 00-3671,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1217 (7th Cir. 2002), an
unpublished opinion, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Gendron. Recognizing
that the holding in Gendron was the minority view, the court stated that "[b]owing to stare
deci/is, we are reluctant to overrule a recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from
the Supreme Court." Id. at *7.
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petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, but that Congress
"presumably" possessed knowledge of when a judgment of con-
viction becomes final. The use of the phrase "almost certainly" and
the word "presumably" indicate that the court possessed no
substantial evidence to support these claims. Instead, the court's
reasoning rests upon unsubstantiated presumptions about what
Congress did or did not know.
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits' use of the Russello pre-
sumption2' suffer from the same type of problem. The presumption
does not recognize drafting mistakes. The presumption underlying
the Russello presumption is, therefore, mistake-free draftsmanship
of the statute in question. In most situations, this is a good tool to
use. It would not be practical or beneficial to force courts to decide
whether a given statute was well-drafted before they could
approach a question of statutory interpretation. When there is good
evidence or a general consensus that a particular statute or act is
poorly drafted, however, the Russello presumption must give way.
This is the case with the AEDPA.
Yet another faulty presumption plagued the Third Circuit's
majority opinion in Kapral. The court presumed that there was no
legitimate reason for treating state and federal prisoners differently
in the context of time limitations for filing federal habeas corpus
petitions. A closer look, however, reveals that the catalyst for
habeas corpus reform, the Powell Committee report, focused
exclusively on the problems that existed for state prisoners in the
habeas system. Indeed, the pertinent problem, as it relates to the
limitation period of § 2255, of "unnecessary delay and repetition"
does not attach to habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners.
Because exhaustion is not required of federal prisoners filing for
habeas, 9 shortening the time for federal prisoners to file was
unnecessary. In fact, § 2255 motions constitute such a small portion
of the federal court system caseload that even if delay and
repetition did exist, the burden it would place on federal courts
would be insignificant. The Fourth Circuit's presumption that there
is no principled reason to treat state and federal prisoners
268. The fact that it is called the Russello "presumption" says a lot about this tool's logical
underpinnings.
269. See Kappler, supra note 105, at 481.
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differently for purposes of a time limit for filing habeas corpus
petitions is incorrect. The delay and repetition concerns that
prompted the call for reform in 1996 do not exist in the federal
prisoner habeas corpus context.
The correct reading of § 2255(1) interprets its limitation period
to begin running after the expiration of the ninety-day period a
prisoner has to file a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. Although the Third Circuit got it wrong in
assuming that there was no principled reason for treating state and
federal prisoners differently in this context, the Third Circuit's
holding was correct.
For federal prisoners, a § 2255 motion to vacate sentence is the
equivalent of a petition for habeas corpus relief. The writ of habeas
corpus, the Great Writ, is the last resort of those who have been
wrongly imprisoned. It therefore necessarily occupies an important
and special place in American jurisprudence. In considering
questions involving § 2255 motions, courts should always keep the
rich history of the writ of habeas corpus in the forefront of their
analyses.
In the federal prisoner context, judicial efficiency is not an
adequate justification for beginning the one-year limitation period
when the court of appeals issues its mandate. First, motions to
vacate sentence compose such a small percentage of the federal
judiciary's caseload that limiting them, even in a substantial way,
would have a negligible impact on that caseload. Second, to the
individual prisoner, the effect of limiting the ability to receive a
review of conviction and sentence is great. In most cases, the
prisoner's motion to vacate sentence will be denied and the end
result will be the same as that achieved without the review. The
ability of our justice system to provide adequate review is, however,
still important. The fact that most § 2255 motions fail does not
mean that the review should not be given. 2 0 The negligible benefits
that might accrue in terms of alleviating the judicial workload are
outweighed by the cost to the individual prisoner and to the faith in
the judicial system as a whole.
270. Just because the majority of prison inmates receive a fair trial does not mean the
judicial process should stop with the trial court's decision.
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Congress certainly can, and has, severely restricted the once
broad writ of habeas corpus. In the absence of clear expression from
the legislature, however, courts should not further limit a federal
prisoner's last chance of vindication. As the Kapral majority pointed
out, the intent of Congress to limit delays (ignoring the fact that
delays may not have been a problem in the federal prisoner context)
is fulfilled even if a prisoner is given the extra ninety days.271
"Recognizing that one is allowed 90 days to file a petition for
certiorari does not mitigate the congressional objective of imposing
time limits where none previously existed."
272
Habeas corpus was "[c]onsidered by the Founders as the highest
safeguard of liberty .... 27S It "has been for centuries esteemed the
best and only sufficient defence of personal freedom."274 "[Tihere is
no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired."275 As the writ has
evolved, Congress and the courts have developed a complex set of
rules and procedures to govern it. These rules have necessarily
narrowed the once broad scope and applicability of the writ.276 The
courts should not take it upon themselves to further narrow the
writ unnecessarily, however, in the form of its effectively identical
substitute for federal prisoners, § 2255, based upon presumptions
and canons of statutory construction rendered useless by the poor
draftsmanship of Congress.
Benjamin R. Orye III
271. See Kapral, 166 F.3d at 571 n.4 ("I introduced this legislation ... to impose a statute
of limitations on the filing of habeas corpus petitions.") (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde).
272. Id. at 571.
273. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
274. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1869).
275. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
276. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1996).
20021 485
